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I. INTRODUCTION
The issues revolving around the retention and continued testing of
human donative materials, such as saliva, tissues, and blood are a
longstanding bioethical concern. Whether considering the unauthorized
and continued experimentation on Henrietta Lack’s cancer cells1 or the
events that led to the capture of the Golden State Killer,2 an important
question remains: how can lawmakers ensure the protection of
biotechnology consumers?
With the rapid expansion of genetic
technology, individuals can easily crack the code of their DNA, but this
information comes at a cost. DNA is a powerful identifier and unique to
each individual.3 This comment will explore the shortcomings of privacy
protections in genetic testing. Specifically, this comment will consider
whether a consumer is afforded greater privacy protection depending on
whether the individual chooses genetic analysis in a hospital or Direct to
Consumer (“DTC”) analytical services.4 As technology and its access
improve, regulation of genetic testing is necessary to protect the privacy of
those considering genetic testing. Privacy laws must be enacted to

1
See Rebecca Skloot, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 57 (New York:
Crown Publishers, 2010) (describing the collection and propagation of cervical cancer cells
collected without Henrietta Lacks knowledge or consent. The cell line developed from her
sample has become the oldest and most commonly used cell line in biological research).
2
The Golden State Killer—a rapist and murderer—was captured after 44 years of
police investigation. The capture was made possible through the use of crime scene DNA
and relatives matched through genetic databases. See Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged
Golden State Killer Investigators First Found His Great-Great-Great-Grandparents, WASH.
POST, (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/to-find-allegedgolden-state-killer-investigators-first-found-his-great-great-greatgrandparents/2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b20bec548d501f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.48abb8e17547.
3
See supra notes 27-30 (explaining identical twins are an exception and share
identical DNA).
4
While this note will consider the merits of choosing one service over another,
consideration of test accuracy is outside the scope of this comment.
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specifically address genetic information due to DNA’s unique, identifiable
nature.
II. BACKGROUND
Individuals may choose to analyze their DNA for a variety of reasons.
This section will consider common reasons that consumers choose genetic
analysis. This section will then overview the process of DNA analysis and
explain why genetic privacy is concerning.
A. Why do individuals test their DNA?
When Watson and Crick discovered the double-helix of
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”), they most likely did not imagine a world
in which consumers could unravel their personal DNA codes so easily.5
Since Watson and Crick’s landmark discovery, advancements in DNA
science unlocked tools through which scientists can aid in the formulation
of medical treatment plans for individuals through DNA analysis.6 For
example, DNA analysis has revolutionized how doctors treat breast
cancer.7 After careful analysis of an individual’s DNA, a doctor can
recommend different treatments based on the genetic risk of breast cancer
development or recurrence simply from the results of the analysis.8
Another example is the use of DNA DTC health tests where consumers
learn about potential genetic health risks or the risk of passing a genetically
heritable trait to an offspring through companies like 23andMe.9
DNA analysis has further led to ground-breaking testing outside of
healthcare, such as connecting long-lost relatives to one another.10
Consumers who wish to connect to lost relatives can do so by analyzing
5
Office of NIH History, Identifying DNA, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH,
https://history.nih.gov/exhibits/nirenberg/HS2_DNA.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
6
Id.
7
See generally Karen Lisa Smith, BRCA Mutation Testing in Determining Breast
Cancer
Therapy,
CANCER
J.,
(2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3240813 (explaining that the BRCA gene is
commonly tested in both those who have been previously diagnosed with breast cancer and
those who have family histories of BRCA related cancers. After genetic screening, a doctor
may recommend prophylactic treatments, such as mastectomies.).
8
Id.
9
National Human Genome Research Inst., Genetic Testing FAQ, NAT’L INST. OF
HEALTH, https://www.genome.gov/19516567/faq-about-genetic-testing/ (last visited Nov.
14, 2019); Getting Started, 23ANDME, https://medical.23andme.com/dna-kits/#clia (last
visited Nov. 14, 2019) (23andMe is a company that provides genetic testing for purposes of
health, wellness, and research. The website sells test kits to consumers that are interested in
DNA analysis).
10
See Finding Biological Family, ANCESTRY, https://support.ancestry.com/s/article/USAncestryDNA-for-Adoptees-Search-Strategies (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (showing how
adopted children may use the service to find their biological parents).
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their DNA using services offered by companies with large genetic
databases. 11 These databases have the ability to connect consumers with
unknown or lost relatives through shared DNA.12 While some individuals
utilize these services out of pure curiosity, others use these tools to connect
with unknown family members.13 Many companies provide both relative
matching and analytical services; however, some companies, like
GEDmatch.com only offer post-analysis services.14 This platform allows
consumers to upload test results from another company and search for
genetic relatives in the database.15
B. What happens when an Individual’s DNA is analyzed?
When an individual provides a sample for genetic testing—most often
a saliva sample—that sample is sent to a laboratory for analysis. Different
types of laboratory analyses can be conducted, depending on the service
provider’s aim.16 Most methods of genetic analysis used by the services
described in this comment are classified as molecular analysis, which refers
to the process of tagging individual DNA building blocks to assess
abnormalities.17 This molecular process involves sequencing all or part of
a DNA.18 For example, 23andMe offers to test for certain variations in the
BRCA gene.19 Because the variants of BRCA are known, researchers can
test for the presence or absence of a specific mutation.20 Ancestry tests

11

Id.
Id.
13
Id.
14
GEDmatch.com is a database that provides genealogical tools for researchers and
amateurs alike. Most tools on GEDmatch.com are free. GEDMATCH,
https://www.gedmatch.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
15
See Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy
Database,
THE
ATLANTIC,
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogydatabase/561695/.
16
Amelia Chappelle et al., Understanding Genetics: A New York, Mid-Atlantic Guide
for Patients and Health Professionals, GENETIC ALLIANCE, July 8, 2009, at 78 (Cytogenic
tests look at abnormalities such as translocations and deletions of chromosomes.
Biochemical tests look to analyze the efficacy of metabolic pathways, seeking to determine
if abnormalities in protein outputs are present when cells read genetic material.)
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Do You Speak BRCA?, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/brca// (last visited
Nov. 14, 2019); National Cancer Institute, BRCA Mutations: Cancer Risk and Genetic
Testing, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causesprevention/genetics/brca-fact-sheet#q1 (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (explaining that BRCA1
and BRCA2 are tumor suppressor genes. Mutation in one of these genes indicates a
heightened risk of developing breast or ovarian cancers).
20
Amelia Chappelle et al., Understanding Genetics, supra note 20, at 78.
12
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similarly employ molecular analysis.21 In the process of analyzing the
samples, researchers target sequences of interest and digitize the code.22
Through this process, researchers can analyze the pattern of Guanine,
Thymine, Cytosine, and Adenine proteins.23 Researchers then take the
digitized samples and input them into mass databases to compare various
genetic data samples.24
C. Why should we care about genetic privacy?
First, DNA is the building block of human life.25 DNA provides
instructions to our cells to grow, reproduce, and function.26 While human
species share roughly 99% of their genome, an individual’s genome is
unique.27 Not only is DNA unique, but it is also heritable.28 On
23andMe’s website, the company explains that siblings (other than
identical twins or higher-order multiple births) will share 50% of their
DNA and third cousins will share less than 1% of their DNA 29; yet genetic
analysis can nonetheless recognize third cousins with accuracy.30
Second, the robust size of most genetic databases is sufficient to
match relatives and therefore identify a DNA sample. There are currently
many genetic databases holding more than five million samples.31

21

Frequently
Asked
Questions,
ANCESTRYDNA,
https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/legal/us/faq#about-3 (last visited Sept. 28, 2019); Rafi
Letzter, How Do DNA Ancestry Tests Really Work?, LIVE SCIENCE, (June 4, 2018),
https://www.livescience.com/62690-how-dna-ancestry-23andme-tests-work.html
(explaining Ancestry DNA tests 700,000 locations on a DNA strand).
22
Letzter, supra note 21.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See What is DNA?, Genetics Home Reference: Help Me Understand Genetics, NAT’L
INST. OF HEALTH (October 29, 2019) https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/dna.
26
Letzter, supra note 21.
27
Letzter, supra note 21; see also What is in your DNA Fingerprint?, YOUR GENOME,
(last updated Jun. 2, 2016) https://www.yourgenome.org/facts/what-is-a-dna-fingerprint
(explaining 99% shared DNA is true except in the case of identical twins, that share the
same DNA).
28
See District of Columbia Department of Health, Understanding Genetics: A District
of Columbia Guide for Patients and Health Professionals, GENETIC ALLIANCE, February 17,
2010, at 6.
29
DNA Relatives: The Basics, 23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/enus/articles/212170668-Average-percent-DNA-shared-between-relatives (last visited Nov.
14, 2019) (stating that relationships such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, and half-siblings
will all share about 25% of DNA.).
30
Id.; see also DNA Relatives, supra note 29.
31
Leah Larkin, Database Sizes—September 2018 Update, THE DNA GEEK, (Sep. 3,
2018), http://thednageek.com/database-sizes-september-2018-update/ (demonstrating that
approximate sample sizes among major testing companies as follows: AncestryDNA over
ten million, 23andME over five million, and GEDMatch over one million.).
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According to research by Elrich, any genetic database with roughly three
million entries will likely provide a genetically matched cousin to any
individual of northern European descent.32 Specifically, there is a 99%
chance of a third cousin match and a 65% chance of a second cousin match
in most databases.33 Both AncestryDNA and 23andMe boast a database of
over five million samples, meeting this threshold.34
The practical implication of a large DNA database is that even if the
identity of a DNA sample is unknown, by searching for DNA relatives, an
individual’s identity can be discovered. For example, police officers have
the potential to collect crime scene DNA and discover the individual’s
identity, based upon genetic relatives.35 Recently, law enforcement in
California used this method to identify the Golden State Killer.36 Officials
ran the collected crime scene DNA through a fake profile on
GEDmatch.com, where it was matched the sample to the Golden State
Killer’s brother.37 While easily finding DNA matches for dangerous
criminals is a positive advancement, these databases can be used to detect
the identities of more than just those who have committed serious crimes,
potentially invading an individual’s privacy.38 Even if the size of a genetic
database is insufficient to match an individual’s relative, the database can
be used in conjunction with other readily accessible public records
containing demographic information to identify an individual without their
consent or knowledge.39
The Elrich study, mentioned above, suggests that even DNA
deposited through a health care professional (“HCP”), which must be deidentified pursuant to Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (“HIPAA”), could be re-identified through a database.40 Publicly
32
See Yevin Elrich et al., Identity inference of genomic data using long-range familial
searches, SCIENCE, Oct. 2018, at 2 (describing that authors predict that the size of thirdparty websites such as GEDMatch will expand to this size in the near future.).
33
Id.
34
See Larkin, supra note 31; Id.
35
See e.g., Jamie Durcharme, A DNA Site Helped Authorities Crack the Golden State
Killer Case. Here’s What You Should Know About Your Genetic Data Privacy, TIME, (Apr.
27, 2018), http://time.com/5257474/golden-state-killer-genetic-privacy-concerns/.
36
Id.; see also Matthias Gafini, Here’s the ‘open-source’ genealogy DNA website that
helped crack the Golden State Killer case, THE MERCURY NEWS, (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/04/26/ancestry-23andme-deny-assisting-lawenforcement-in-east-area-rapist-case//.
37
Durcharme, supra note 35; Gafini, supra note 36.
38
Gafini, supra note 36.
39
See Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2.
40
Id. at 2-3; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2029 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29
U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.);
see generally 45 C.F.R.164 (authorized by 42 U.S.C.S. § 1302).
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accessible databases like the 1000 Genomes Project41 provide public access
to “de-identified” patient information such as raw genetic data and birth
year of research participants.42 The study found that samples deposited
through HCPs could be re-identified just as the investigator did in the
Golden State Killer Case.43 To test the hypothesis, researchers began with
known samples searching for ancestors in GEDmatch.44 The researchers
eventually re-identified the sample.45 The researchers noted that, although
medical research samples are collected through HIPAA protected entities
and stripped of identifiable information, there remains a significant risk of
exposure because DNA may be re-identified, rendering private information
no longer private.46
III. LAWS AND REGULATION GOVERNING PRIVACY OF GENETIC
INFORMATION
This section will consider current federal and state privacy laws that
regulate genetic testing performed by either a healthcare provider or directto-consumer genetic testing company.
A. HIPAA
The Privacy Rule was promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), which aims to
protect Patient Health Information (“PHI”).47 The Privacy Rule applies to
three types of entities and their business associates: health plans, health
clearinghouses, and health care providers that transmit health information
electronically.48 PHI is defined as information that is created or received
by a covered entity that “relates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health [. . .] of an individual,” including care to an individual or the
payment for health care.49 The Privacy Rule has four aims: (1) “[e]nsure
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic protected

41

The 1000 Genomes Project is an international research consortium formed for the
goal of sequencing 1000 genomes and providing a greater understanding of genetic data.
After sequencing over 1000 genomes, the consortium created an open-access database with
the information. See generally, Olivier Devuyst, The 1000 Genomes Project: Welcome to a
New World, J. OF INT’L SOC’Y FOR PERITONEAL DIALYSIS (Dec. 2015).
42
Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2, 3.
43
Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2, 3.
44
Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2, 3.
45
Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2, 3.
46
Elrich et al., supra note 32, at 2, 3.
47
See generally The Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2003) (authorized by 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 1302 (2019)).
48
45 C.F.R. § 164.104.
49
45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
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health information;” (2) protect from threats or hazards to PHI security; (3)
“protect against any reasonably anticipated uses” of the PHI; and (4) ensure
compliance with the privacy rule.50 In effect, the rule allows for disclosure,
collection, and storage of identifiable health information subject to
specified conditions, among other things.
HIPAA only covers the identifiable information collected from
patients of a covered entity.51 Health care providers include, but are not
limited to, “a hospital, critical access hospital, skilled nursing facility [ . . .]
or a fund.”52 Covered entities are also classified by the services provided.
Medical services, defined in 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395x(s), include diagnostic
services—but only those “furnished to an individual as an outpatient by a
hospital or by others under arrangements with them made by a hospital”
and “ordinarily furnished by such hospital (or by others under such
arrangements) to its outpatients for the purpose of diagnostic study.”53 The
rule covers diagnostic tests performed by a health care provider.54 DTC
companies are not considered health care providers,55 and thus these
companies are not required to comply with HIPAA.
Under the Privacy Rule, genetic data that is stripped from the patient’s
personal information (e.g., name and address) is considered de-identified
information.56 Under HIPPA, when the genetic data is no longer connected
to personally identifiable information, it may be shared freely, without
express patient consent.
B. Federal Trade Commission Oversight
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) aims to, among other things,
protect individuals from deceptive advertising.57 Presently, the FTC’s
scope is limited to ensuring truth in regulating commerce activities;
however, the FTC’s scope may soon expand to include privacy
regulation.58 The U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
50

45 C.F.R. § 164.306.
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.102.
52
45 C.F.R. § 160.103; 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395x(u).
53
42 U.S.C.S. § 1395x(s)(2)(c).
54
See generally 45 C.F.R. § 160.
55
DTC companies provide this information without necessarily involving a health care
provider. See What is direct to consumer genetic testing, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH,
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/dtcgenetictesting/directtoconsumer (last visited Nov. 14,
2019).
56
United States Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Health Information Privacy,
(last updated Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/specialtopics/de-identification/index.html.
57
About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited
Nov. 14, 2019).
58
See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 45(a)(1) (2019); Press Release,
51
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Transportation held multiple hearings to discuss expanding data privacy
regulation by the FTC.59 In opening remarks, Senator Thune stated the
question surrounding data privacy “is no longer whether we need a federal
law to protect consumers’ privacy. The question is what shape it should
take.”60 This action follows recent data breaches, as seen with the
Equifax61 and Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandals.62 As of 2019,
the Senate committee continues to evaluate a response to the privacy laws
enacted by the State of California63 and the European Union.64 The
European Union enacted the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”), which is geared towards protecting the privacy of consumers’
information in this digital age, and classifies the privacy from unauthorized
data processing as a fundamental right.65 The Senate committee has
indicated that the FTC best serves the purpose of regulating privacy
because of its role in consumer protection.66 The committee has not held
further hearings on the topic since May 2019.67

U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., Committee Announces Second Data
Privacy
Hearing
(Oct.
4,
2018)
(on
file
at
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=2E7C60ED-9D88418B-B5E0-EE2C41941E8C).
59
Press Release, supra note 58; see also Consumer Data Privacy: Examining Lessons
From the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and the California
Consumer Privacy Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, &
Transp.,
Committee,
116th
Cong.
(Oct.
10,
2018)
(on
file
at
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2018/10/consumer-data-privacy-examining-lessonsfrom-the-european-union-s-general-data-protection-regulation-and-the-california-consumerprivacy-act).
60
Press Release, supra note 58.
61
The Equifax Data Breach, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/equifax-databreach (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
62
Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as
Fallout
Widens,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
(March
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analyticaexplained.html.
63
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (effective Jan.
2020).
64
European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=en.
65
Id.
66
Press Release, supra note 58.
67
U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., Committee, Consumer
Perspectives: Policy Principles for a Federal Data Privacy Framework: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., Committee, 116th Cong. (May 1, 2019)
(on file at https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=EC293594BD9A-4F07-9B7D-B9EFE65E7DC4)
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The FTC is responsible for regulation of nonprescription medical
device advertising.68 The FTC has actively regulated and challenged the
advertising representations of DTC tests, including GeneLink, Inc. and
Foru International Corporation.69 The FTC was concerned with the validity
of their recommendations.70 The FTC ensures that a company will adhere
to promises of privacy presented to consumers when using their products.71
The FTC’s present scope of privacy control is limited to enforcement of the
company’s privacy policies, discussed below.
C. Food and Drug Administration Regulations
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates both in-hospital
genetic testing and DTC testing when used to provide health information.72
Both are classified as medical devices and are considered genetic health
risk (GHR) tests under the regulations.73 Most GHR tests are classified as
Class III Medical Devices that require pre-market review prior to sale
because there is no predicate device on the market.74 The FDA in the past
practiced “enforcement discretion” over the DTC tests, meaning the FDA
deferred regulation and allowed the tests to be sold without pre-review.75
The FDA classified GHR tests as low-risk laboratory developed tests.76 In
2013, after a growing concern over the accuracy of DTC tests, the FDA
halted the marketing of all DTC tests that provided health information.77
Later, in 2017, the FDA changed their stance after acknowledging the
growing popularity and risk of GHR testing.78
The FDA ensures accuracy and consistency in GHR tests.79 Notably,
the FDA also requires that the risks of use and the results of these tests,
when conveying medical information, be presented in a way that
68

Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating DirectTo-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. L. REV. 677, 717 (2014).
69
Complaint at 1-2, In re GeneLink, Inc. & Foru Int’l Corp., No. 112-3095 (F.T.C.
Jan. 7, 2014) (The companies recommended certain dietary supplements based upon genetic
tests).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 686.
73
Id.
74
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 703; Evaluation of Automatic Class III
Designation
(De
Novo),
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADM’,
https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/
premarketsubmissions/ucm462775.htm (last visited Nov. 15. 2019).
75
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68.
76
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68.
77
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 705-6.
78
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68 (this acknowledgement was part of the 21st
Century Cures Act).
79
Evaluation of Automatic Class III, supra note 74.
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consumers can understand and use.80 The FDA requires warnings that
include privacy risks and health results.
D. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA)
The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988
(“CLIA”) were enacted to improve the quality of clinical laboratories.81
CLIA is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services
through the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) in
conjunction with the Food and Drug Administration and the Centers for
Disease Control.82 Clinical laboratories include those that examine
“materials derived from the human body to provide information for the
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the
assessment of the health of, human beings.”83 CLIA regulates genetic
testing when genetic analysis is used for health information; both direct-toconsumer tests like 23andMe84, Helix85 and laboratories used by hospitals86
must be CLIA certified because they provide health information.87
Conversely, laboratories like Ancestry.com do not test their samples
in CLIA certified laboratories because their analysis is used only for
genealogical analysis, not health information.88 CLIA’s purpose is to
ensure the quality of laboratories.89 CLIA does not expressly have a direct
80
Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, FDA Allows Marketing Of First
Direct-To-Consumer Tests That Provide Genetic Risk Information For Certain Conditions
(Apr.
6,
2017)
(on
file
at
https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm551185.htm).
81
42 U.S.C.S. § 263(a).
82
About CLIA, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://wwwn.cdc.gov/clia/About.aspx
(last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
83
42 U.S.C.S. §§ 263a (a-b) (explaining that no person may accept and/or examine
samples from human beings without a CLIA certificate).
84
Genetic Science, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/genetic-science/ (last visited
Nov. 14, 2019).
85
HELIX, https://www.helix.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
86
CLIA Laboratory Certification, INVITAE, https://support.invitae.com/hc/enus/articles/115000002427-Is-Invitae-Clinical-Laboratory-Improvement-AmendmentsCLIA-certified (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (explaining the certifications status of Invitae, a
laboratory that process samples sent from health care providers); see also CLIA Laboratory
Certification,
AMBRY
GENETICS,
https://www.ambrygen.com/file/material/view/759/CLIA_EXP_5.29.20.pdf (last visited
Nov. 14, 2019) (demonstrating the certification of Ambry Genetics, a lab that processes
samples from a health care provider for genetic testing).
87
See e.g., HELIX, supra note 85; INVITAE, supra note 86; AMBRY GENETICS, supra note
86.
88
See 42 U.S.C.S. § 263a(a).
89
But see Stephany Tandy-Connor et al., False-Positive Results Released By Direct-toConsumer Genetic Tests Highlight the Importance of Clinical Confirmation Testing for
Appropriate
Patient
Care,
NATURE,
(Mar.
22,
2018),
https://www.nature.com/articles/gim201838 (demonstrating that not all results are accurate);
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impact on an individual’s privacy; however, the operation of the
regulations may affect individual privacy.90 While CLIA requires
laboratories to retain data for at least two years, it does not restrict the use
of stored data. 91 Laboratories operating under the scope of CLIA cannot
delete consumer or patient information, even upon request of the
individual.92
E. The Federal Common Rule
The Federal Common Rule regulates any institution conducting
federally-funded research with human subjects.93 Some DTC testing
companies, like 23andMe, perform this kind of federally-funded research.94
The Common Rule requires approval by an institutional review board
(IRB) before beginning most research that involves a human subject.95 Part
of the IRB requirements include the documentation of the privacy
standards that will be employed to protect the confidentiality of
participants.96 As outlined in the regulations, the individual department
heads provide industry-specific guidance.97 In addition to the requirements
above, the Common Rule requires that researchers maintain their records
for at least three years.98
The Common Rule also sets forth regulations for the standards of
informed consent for participants in research projects.99 The statement of
informed consent must include a “concise and focused presentation of the
key information.”100 Informed consent requires a statement of the purpose,
risks or discomforts, benefits, alternatives, and confidentiality

see also Phil Rogers et al., DNA Test Says it Will Implement New Controls After NBC 5
NBC
NEWS
CHICAGO,
May
2,
2018,
4:41
PM,
Report,
https://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/DNA-Test-Says-itt-Will-Take-Implement-NewControls-After-NBC-5-Report-481551691.html (explaining high false-positive rate in directto-consumer genetic testing).
90
See Kristen V. Brown, Deleting Your Online DNA Data Is Brutally Difficult,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS,
(Jun.
15,
2018,
5:00
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-15/deleting-your-online-dna-data-isbrutally-difficult; 42 C.F.R. § 493.1105(a)(6) (2019).
91
42 C.F.R. § 493.1105(a)(6).
92
See Brown, supra note 90; 42 C.F.R. § 493.1105(a)(6).
93
45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a).
94
Privacy Policy, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (last visited
Sept. 28, 2019).
95
45 C.F.R. § 46.115(a).
96
45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7).
97
45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a).
98
45 C.F.R. § 46.115(b).
99
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1)-(8).
100
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(5)(i).
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protections.101 The disclosure must include a statement that the researchers
are collecting identifiable information and whether that information will be
de-identified.102
If the researchers plan to distribute de-identified
information, for example to a third-party for analysis, the future use of even
the de-identified material must be included in the informed consent.103
Similar to HIPAA, the Common Rule exempts de-identified information.104
Secondary testing of de-identified information may be carried out without
IRB approval.105
F. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) was
enacted in 2008 to prevent discrimination based upon genetic
information.106 While the Act provides some privacy protection, it is
limited to protection from discrimination in purchasing health insurance
and employment.107 Because of this limitation,108 the Act does not
adequately protect consumers of genetic testing services.109 While GINA
provides some protections, its application is too narrow to ensure the
privacy of genetic information for most consumers.
G. State Laws
Currently, no federal law covers the privacy of genetic information
disclosed to DTC testing companies; however, many states have enacted
their own genetic or general privacy laws.110 States have approached
genetic data protection in different ways. This section discusses some of
the most notable approaches. Important questions addressed by these laws
involve the retention of ownership over genetic data after deposit.
Specifically, does the individual who submitted the sample or the company
that analyzed the DNA own the data? Regardless of the data’s owner, state
laws recognize that DNA is sensitive information and requires consent

101

45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1)-(5).
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(9).
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See generally, Fed. Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’),
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
SERVICES,
(last
updated
Mar.
18,
2016),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/common-rule/index.html.
106
See generally Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 110 P.L. 233, 122 Stat.
881 (2008).
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
GINA expanded HIPAA protections to include genetic information under the
definition of patient health information under HIPAA. Id. § 1180(a).
110
See e.g., Alaska Stat. §§ 18.13.010–100 (2004).
102
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before sharing. Thus, the key issue of privacy law is consent.
Alaska’s Genetic Privacy Act focuses on ownership, and states “a
DNA sample and the results of a DNA analysis performed on the sample
are the exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed.”111 This law
ensures that the individual maintains ownership of their sampled
information even after the DNA is analyzed. The Act allows an exception
for law enforcement or medical necessity.112 Notably, the law requires
informed and written consent that is specific to the analysis performed.113
A general release for genetic analysis is insufficient.114
New York (“NY”) takes a different approach to regulating the genetic
testing market, especially DTC tests.115 To market or sell DTC tests to
consumers, the company must first register the product as an over-thecounter device with the FDA.116 NY Civil Rights Laws also include
heightened confidentiality requirements.117 Under NY law, genetic testing
is strictly confined to the tests for which consent was given.118 The NY law
differs, significantly, from the Alaska law in scope. NY’s law is applicable
only when considering genetic testing for the purpose of medical
diagnostics.119 NY’s laws add heightened confidentiality protections, but
do not provide the same degree of ownership afforded in Alaska.
While some states chose to regulate the privacy of genetic
information, California enacted laws to protect data privacy on a broad
scale.120 California’s Consumer Privacy Act, effective January of 2020, has
three primary aims: (1) to give individuals ownership of their data; (2) to
give individuals control over the information collected from them; and (3)
to provide increased security for consumers.121 In providing ownership and
control of data, the law requires disclosures from companies about what
information is collected122 and also requires that companies delete any data

111

Alaska Stat. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2004).
Alaska Stat. § 18.13.010(b) (2004).
113
Alaska Stat. § 18.13.010(c) (2004).
114
Id.
115
See generally N.Y. C.L.S. Civ. R., Art. 7, § 79-l (2002).
116
See Emily Mullin, As Consumer DNA Testing Grows, Two States Resist, MIT TECH.
REV. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608958/as-consumer-dnatesting-grows-two-states-resist/; see also N.Y. C.L.S. Civ. R., Art. 7, § 79-l (2002).
117
See generally N.Y. C.L.S. Civ. R., Art. 7, § 79-l (2002).
118
Id.
119
N.Y. C.L.S. Civ. R., Art. 7, § 79-l(1)(a) (2002); cf. Alaska Stat. §§ 18.13.010-100
(2004) (where Alaska’s statute applies broadly to include paternity, law enforcement, and
medicine, New York’s statute is limited to tests performed for medical purposes).
120
See About, CA PRIVACY, https://www.caprivacy.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
121
Id.
122
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (2018).
112
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collected upon consumer request.123
In ensuring the security of
information, the law adds penalties for companies with data breaches.124 In
addition, the state has enacted its own expansion of GINA, CalGINA,
which includes genetic information as a protected class under state laws.125
IV. PRIVACY POLICIES OF DTC GENETIC TESTING COMPANIES
The specific policies of each genetic testing company provide the
most insight into consumer privacy protections. 23andMe’s privacy policy
outlines how the company ensures the protection of consumer data once the
company receives it.126 The company explains, “23andMe will not sell,
lease, or rent your individual-level information to any third party or to a
third party for research purposes without your explicit consent.”127 Later in
the privacy policy, individual-level data is defined as information “. . .
about a single individual’s genotypes, diseases or other traits/
characteristics, but which is not necessarily tied to Registration
Information.”128
23andMe represents that consumer consent is a
prerequisite to disclosure of genetic data or personally identifiable
information to certain parties contained within the privacy statement.129
The Privacy Policy further states that even if an individual does not consent
to 23andMe research, “. . . Genetic Information and Self-Reported
Information may still be used by us and shared with our third party service
providers.”130 While 23andMe cannot lease, sell, or rent the data to a thirdparty without consent, it seems clear that the company reserves the right to
disclose identifiable information to a third-party service provider for other
purposes.131 23andMe limits who the company can share information to,
but the company does not limit what information can be shared under the
123

Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.105 (2018).
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150-55 (2018).
125
Senate Bill No. 559, (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_0551-0600/sb_559_bill_20110906_chaptered.pdf.
126
Privacy
Policy,
23ANDME,
(last
updated
Sept.
30,
2019)
https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
See Privacy Policy, supra note 126. Genetic Information is defined as “Information
regarding your genotype (e.g. the As, Ts, Cs, and Gs at particular locations in your
genome)” and includes reported results. Self-reported Information is defined as
“information you provide directly to us, including your disease conditions, other healthrelated information, personal traits, ethnicity, family history, and other information that you
enter into surveys, forms, or features while signed in to your 23andMe account.”
131
See Privacy Policy, supra note 126. The 23andMe Privacy Policy uses third party to
reference companies like Facebook and Twitter, along with laboratories and researchers.
The privacy policy, however, does not specify the purposes for which the information may
be used.
124

SKLAR (DO NOT DELETE)

192

1/27/2020 12:06 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1

policy.132
V. ANALYSIS
Ensuring genetic privacy is tricky. The information that a consumer
provides to a company when choosing genetic testing is unique and
important.133 The information should be handled with care. Currently, no
federal law ensures consumer privacy of this vital genetic information used
by DTC testing companies, and instead enforcement of privacy is left to the
FTC.134 The FTC promises to enforce good faith and fair dealing, but their
power in regulating genetic testing is limited to enforcing the promises
made in that company’s confusing privacy policy.135 While some states
took action to ensure consumer privacy through the enactment of genetic
privacy laws, the lack of uniformity created a patchwork of protection,
furthering consumer confusion.136 The question of who a consumer can
trust to hold and analyze their DNA has no simple answer. This section
explores some of the shortcomings of the current regulatory framework
while considering what a consumer’s best option may be for genetic
privacy. This section then argues that the current lack of uniformity in
DNA privacy law leaves consumers vulnerable and seriously compromised
to receive information through analysis of their DNA.
A. Looking to Future Regulation: Different classifications, same test?
Using the purpose of genetic analysis to determine whether a test
falls under certain regulation leaves consumers vulnerable.
Genetic testing and genealogy testing are monitored and regulated
differently; however, the differences should not compromise the
consumer’s privacy in the process of conducting analysis. Furthermore,
these similar testing mechanisms should be regulated similarly for the sake
of consistency and predictability in regulation. Although DNA may be
sequenced in both instances, companies are not required to comply with
FDA,137 HHS,138 or CLIA139 regulations of laboratories in genealogy testing
132

See Privacy Policy, supra note 126.
Genetics Home Reference, supra note 25.
134
About the FTC, supra note 57.
135
About the FTC, supra note 57.
136
Genetic Discrimination and Other Laws, NAT’L INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, (Apr. 17,
2017), https://www.genome.gov/27568503/genetic-discrimination-and-other-laws/.
137
See generally, Evaluation of Automatic Class III, supra note 74 (A kit used to
sample saliva for genealogical testing does not require FDA approval as it is not a medical
device).
138
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, (last updated March 18, 2016) https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulationsand-policy/regulations/common-rule/index.html (HHS Common Rule does not apply in
133

SKLAR (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

1/27/2020 12:06 PM

BE CAREFUL WHERE YOU SPIT

193

due to a loophole created by the fact that the companies do not produce
health information.140 In looking towards a data privacy plan, lawmakers
should consider whether companies like 23andMe or Ancestry.com can be
effectively regulated under a broad privacy law, or in the alternative,
whether DNA data presents a unique problem that will require more
scrutinized regulation. If lawmakers choose to regulate the field of genetic
analysis to improve privacy under a federal law, lawmakers must consider
several important questions: (1) should consumers be afforded “ownership”
of their genetic data?; (2) is the distinction between health information and
genetic ancestral information material?; and (3) will DNA regulation slow
advancements in health care? This section will argue that due to the
identifiable nature and unique quality of familial DNA, regulating this field
requires more than a federal privacy law.
1. Data Privacy is Not Sufficient to Protect Consumers of
Genetic Testing
When consumers or patients participate in genetic testing, the risk
associated with allowing a company to digitize their DNA is unclear.141
When a consumer deposits a DNA sample, the sample is retained for a
significant period of time.142 Science has yet to fully understand the use
and importance of retained DNA samples.143 Lawmakers must consider
whether legislation should aim to ensure consumers own or control their
DNA, even after analysis is performed.144 This consideration must also
account for and remain adaptable to scientific advancements of DNA use
and development.
One journalist—after comparing multiple DTC companies—felt
unsettled about how easily and freely her genetic material flowed.145 The
journalist wrote an article comparing the results of her genetic analysis
from many of the major DTC and genealogical companies.146 The
journalist then attempted to delete her data from the companies that she

ancestry DNA testing).
139
About CLIA, supra note 82.
140
42 U.S.C.S. § 263(a); 21 C.F.R. § 600.3.
141
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 729.
142
See 42 C.F.R. 493.1105(a)(6).
143
Carrie Arnold and Mosaic, The Uncertain Future of Genetic Testing, THE ATLANTIC
(Jul. 19, 2017).
144
See generally, Emily Mullin, As Consumer DNA Testing Grows, Two States Resist,
MIT TECHN. REVIEW, Sept. 28, 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608958/asconsumer-dna-testing-grows-two-states-resist./.
145
See Brown, supra note 90.
146
See Brown, supra note 90.

SKLAR (DO NOT DELETE)

194

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/27/2020 12:06 PM

[Vol. 44:1

used.147 It became clear to the journalist that deleting DNA from these
websites is far trickier than she expected.148 In fact, the journalist was
ultimately unable to remover her data from the website.149 The privacy
policies are long and confusing, and the companies’ compliance with CLIA
regulation requires them to retain her DNA sample for at least three
years.150
The issue of DNA regulation is unique, because the data itself is
unique.151 Currently, no federal law provides ownership of data, especially
not genetic data. However, in drafting new legislative enactments,
lawmakers should consider whether the aim is to protect genetic data after
it is generated or to provide consumers with control over the data.
Practically, an individual may wish to control their genetic data to ensure
its safety, to delete their data, or potentially to sell their data to another
party. However, companies investing in the development of DNA analysis
also have interests in aggregating and selling the data. Data aggregation
has played a large role in the advancement of genetic analysis and may
even be critical to further developments.152 The answer is that lawmakers
should seek a combination of structures: allow consumers additional
control, ensure safety in data storage, but should not grant complete
ownership to ensure privacy protections do not hamper further
developments.
In doing so, lawmakers can ensure they continue
encouraging technological developments and consumer safety.
Reaching a uniform method of genetic privacy protection is a timely
concern. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation recently held hearings to address consumer privacy law on a
federal scale.153 While some states already acted, the resultant patchwork
protection is ineffective for both consumer protection and company
efficiency. In Alaska, lawmakers answered the question of genetic privacy
by providing ownership of genetic data post-analysis.154 Other states, like
California, instead focused on data privacy and the right to delete data.155 It
is likely, if lawmakers use these laws as a model, that a new law would
147

See Brown, supra note 90.
See Brown, supra note 90.
149
See Brown, supra note 90.
150
See Brown, supra note 90.
151
See generally, Mullin, supra note 144.
152
See generally, Olivier Devuyst, The 1000 Genomes Project: Welcome to a New
World, J. OF THE INT’L SOCIETY FOR PERITONEAL DIALYSIS (Dec. 2015); see e.g., Aparna
Vidyasagar, What is CRISPR?, LIVE SCIENCE (Apr. 20, 2018) (Explaining the use and
advancement of CRISPR-Cas9 technology as a gene-editing tool).
153
Policy Principles, supra note 67.
154
See e.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.13.010 (2013).
155
See About, CA PRIVACY, https://www.caprivacy.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
148
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favor data privacy and add a right to delete as well as a heightened
requirement for informed consent, but not the right to retain ownership,
because privacy-focused laws are more numerous than ownership-focused
laws.156 Lawmakers likely would not impose full ownership of data,
because such regulation may stagnate further development in genetic
science. Because the future of DNA research is uncertain and the power of
DNA has yet to be fully realized, it is imperative that consumers retain an
ability to delete their DNA.
The California Consumer Privacy Act focuses on ensuring consumer
consent to data collection and retention.157 While this is an excellent step
towards ensuring consumer privacy, in the realm of genetics, consent is not
sufficient. Individuals share a significant amount of their DNA with family
members: siblings, parents, and cousins.158 In the case of the Golden State
Killer, the suspect did not consent to DNA testing, but his brother’s DNA
was publicly available on GEDmatch.com, providing an adequate
identifiable link.159 Consent does not ensure privacy because of the shared
DNA between family members. When genetic privacy laws focus on
consent alone, they overlook the crucial consideration that many
individuals who do not participate in genetic testing are still affected by
these laws. Due to the popularity and size of genetic databases, statistically,
almost every individual has a genetic link in at least one database.160 While
consent is a step towards greater privacy, the regulation of genetic data is
sui generis, and regulating DNA requires a fine-tuned approach that
understands the familial connection.
Regulating consent in genetic testing is an impractical solution to
genetic privacy. By regulating consent, privacy laws do not protect the
genetic relatives of those offering their consent. Privacy is always
important; however, in consideration of genetic privacy, it is even more
important, because third parties cannot practically offer consent on behalf
of another. The Golden State Killer did not consent when his relative used
an ancestral database; yet, the Golden State Killer was still identified using
a freely accessible database.161 Like the GDPR, a genetic privacy law
156

See e.g., Alaska Stat. §18.13.010 (2018).
Id.
158
Average
Percent
DNA
Shared
Between
Relatives,
23ANDME
https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/212170668-Average-percent-DNAshared-between-relatives (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
159
Durcharme, supra note 35.
160
See District of Columbia Department of Health, supra note 28; see also supra notes
31-35.
161
See Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy
Database,
THE
ATLANTIC,
June
1,
2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogy157
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should aim to keep information private. GDPR focuses on safeguarding the
information once it is collected,162 but GDPR does not fully account for the
unique quality of DNA. GDPR and the California Consumer Privacy Act
provide starting points for drafting new law, but these laws do not fully
protect consumers, as discussed below.
2. The Difference Between Health Information and Ancestry
Analysis is Immaterial and Therefore Both Approaches
Should be Regulated as Similar Tests
Presently, regulation distinguishes between genetic analysis aimed at
providing health information and genetic analysis aimed at providing
ancestral information.163 This is likely because the health industry is highly
regulated, and lawmakers have an interest in protecting patients and
ensuring they receive adequate care. The risk of providing inaccurate
information for health risks is much higher than that of ancestry because
consumers can make medical decisions based upon genetic health risks.164
Considering the disparity of risk in providing inaccurate information, this
distinction seems appropriate. Whenever focusing on consumer privacy,
this distinction makes less sense. In either event, an individual has enough
information about their DNA analyzed and digitized to create an
identifiable data sample.165 For this reason, lawmakers must consider a
legal approach specific to genetic privacy, not just data privacy.
To avoid liabilities and regulatory controls, DTC companies can and
have bifurcated, splitting their companies and services to avoid
regulation.166 This means that companies might provide either sequencing
or interpretation of DNA and rely upon a third party for the remaining
service.167 Other companies may instead require a physician intermediary
to ensure compliance with testing regulations.168 While companies can
adapt to new regulations, the fact that genetic data is regulated as either a
laboratory test or health information means that companies can split their

database/561695.
162
See generally, European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679,
Art.
1,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=en.
163
See 42 U.S.C.S. § 263(a) (2019); 21 C.F.R. 600.3 (2019) (Regulations such as FDA
and CLIA only apply to laboratories that provide health information, not ancestry).
164
Bob Curley, Up to 40 Percent of At-Home Genetic Test Results May Be ‘False
Positives,’ HEALTHLINE, (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/40percent-at-home-genetic-test-results-false-positives.
165
Id.
166
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 729.
167
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 730.
168
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 728.
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services into two separate companies to avoid regulation and liability.169
However, if the goal of heightened oversight from the FDA and CLIA in
DTC health tests is to ensure consumer protection, should those same
protections not be afforded to consumers of ancestry tests?
Not only can companies avoid regulations, but consumers may also
bypass these regulatory safeguards. Ancestral testing companies, like
Ancestry.com, allow consumers to obtain their raw DNA data.170 If a test is
performed only to produce a raw DNA sequence it can avoid compliance
with FDA and HHS regulations.171 The output information can later be
utilized to provide health information.172 Under the current regulatory
framework, the same genetic test is subject to materially different
regulation depending on the purpose of the test.173
Lawmakers clearly understood the unique quality of genetic data
when they enacted GINA. However, since the enactment of GINA, genetic
data has become more accessible to consumers. GINA’s protections must
be expanded to ensure discrimination does not occur in contexts outside the
rule’s current scope. GINA, for example, does not protect from
discrimination in some insurance contexts such as disability insurance,
long-term care insurance, or life insurance.174 It may be a necessary
business policy to exclude individuals with genetic abnormalities from life
insurance; however, it is unlikely consumers fully understand the
downstream effects of testing their DNA when they reach for a DTC test.
If an individual has a genetic condition covered under GINA, that same
individual is likely in need of additional insurance plans like those listed
above. By choosing to use a genetic test, that individual may render
themselves unqualified for necessary insurance benefits without
understanding this risk at the time of testing.
GINA’s current scope is too narrow to protect consumers’s use of
genetic analysis effectively. By ensuring protections only in the realm of
health insurance and employment, lawmakers are effectively masking the
problem. GINA has a broad name that seems to offer a promise of wideranging protections, when in reality, the law is extremely limited in scope.

169

Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 728-30.
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 21.
171
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 730.
172
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 730.
173
Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 68, at 730-31.
174
Can the results of direct-to-consumer genetic testing affect my ability to get
insurance?,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
HEALTH,
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/dtcgenetictesting/dtcinsurancerisk (last visited Sept. 28,
2019).
170
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If the legislature enacts a new law to protect consumer privacy, the
most effective regulator is the FTC. The FTC is presently the only
regulatory agency with jurisdiction over all types of genetic analysis: health
care provider, DTC testing, and genealogy.175 Therefore, the FTC is a
reasonable choice for such regulation. However, as argued above, it is
necessary to enact a law specific to the unique problem of genetic testing,
and if such an approach were taken, the FTC would not be the most
appropriate regulator of the tests, because the scope of the FTC’s
regulatory power is too narrow. Instead, the legislature would need to
expand the classification of health information to also include genealogy.
These types of genetic analyses could be effectively regulated under the
supervision of the FDA as those methods of analyses employ a device that
is either used to produce health information or has the capacity to produce
health information.
3. Regulation Must Encourage Further Advancements in DNA.
Free information sharing is important to the advancement of DNA
technology. When data is shared freely, researchers learn from one another
and advance more quickly. Stagnation in research often occurs when
researchers cannot collaborate. Genetic research is still a growing field.176
Many questions remain as to what can be learned from and manipulated in
DNA.177 Much of the existing advancement of genetic research is
attributable to the free sharing of data.178 While it is important to protect
consumer privacy, these concerns must be balanced against the utility of
collaborative science.179
With this in mind, it is important for lawmakers to consider and
ensure that privacy protection does not limit the ability of scientists to
further developments in genetic research. This problem, however, presents
a simple solution. As it stands, many genetic databases, regardless if the
information is collected through a HIPAA protected entity, can be accessed
by any researcher, regardless of their credentials.180 Individuals should be
175

See generally About the FTC, supra note 57.
See Carrie Arnold and Mosaic, The Uncertain Future of Genetic Testing, THE
ATLANTIC, (July 19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/07/theuncertain-future-of-genetic-testing/534045/.
177
See, e.g., Aparna Vidyasagar, What is CRISPR?, LIVE SCIENCE, (Apr. 20, 2018)
(explaining the use and advancement of CRISPR-Cas9 technology as a gene-editing tool).
178
See generally, Olivier Devuyst, The 1000 Genomes Project: Welcome to a New
World, JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR PERITONEAL DIALYSIS (2015).
179
Sejin Ahn, Whose Genome Is It Anyway?: Re-identification and Privacy Protection
in Public and Participatory Genomics, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 802 (2015) (suggesting
that if DNA databases are permitted to free source genetic information, further protections
should restrict access).
180
See Devuyst, supra note 178.
176
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allowed to freely input their own data and retrieve information related to
their own genetic analysis. However, privacy should ensure that not every
researcher or layman can obtain access to listings of inputted genetic data.
Licensing or training should be necessary to access this information. DNA
is unique to an individual and because it can be re-identified, it should be
handled with care. Licensing would provide a simple method to ensure
appropriate safeguards to the development of science, while ensuring
protection of consumers.
Presently, the issue of genetic privacy is approached from the wrong
angle. DTC health testing will likely continue to appeal to the market as an
easily accessible tool to learn about potential health risk.181 The only way to
ensure that consumers receive the same level of protection as in-hospital
testing is to regulate it under a genetic privacy law.
B. Where should you send your spit?
With the regulatory framework explained above in mind, the question
remains: when an individual look to analyze their DNA, which type of
service will provide the greatest protection to their privacy? The following
section will explore the privacy benefits and pitfalls of the four main
frameworks: (1) in-hospital testing; (2) DTC genetic health testing; (3)
DTC ancestry testing; and, (4) ancestral databases. The following will not
consider the accuracy of genetic testing or other cost/benefits, but the
privacy protections afforded by the different services.
1. In-Hospital Genetic Testing is Not as Safe as it Seems.
In-hospital genetic testing may offer greater accuracy, but privacy
protections for these types of tests are lacking.182 A consumer may think
that this avenue would provide them with the greatest privacy, but that may
not be the case. When a doctor orders genetic testing at a hospital, an
individual is protected by the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act.183 While HIPAA protects individual
privacy, it allows for the sharing of patient health information once the
information is deemed de-identified.184 It is important to note that
“information inherent in DNA can be retrieved by relatively simple
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See Steven Salzberg, NY Times, Why Are You So Worried About 23andMe’s Genetic
Tests, FORBES, Feb. 4, 2019; see also Editorial Board, Why You Should Be Careful About
23andMe’s Health Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2019; Anne Wojcicki, 23andMe Responds:
Empowering Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2019.
182
How can consumers be sure a genetic test is valid and useful?, NAT’L INST. OF
HEALTH, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/validtest (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
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Ahn, supra note 179, at 772-775.

SKLAR (DO NOT DELETE)

200

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/27/2020 12:06 PM

[Vol. 44:1

processing,” meaning that DNA can be re-identified.185 HIPAA protection
does not account for the re-identifiable nature of DNA.186
Not only does HIPAA allow the free sharing of “de-identified” patient
information, but many databases exist that allow public access to genetic
databases for genetic research. These include laboratory databases, the
NIH database, and open source databases from data sharing campaigns.187
“Free the Data!” is a grassroots movement to share sequenced data to
advance genetic technologies.188 Laboratories and hospitals that sequence
and analyze patient genetic samples participate in grassroots data sharing
campaigns.189
Patient information, once analyzed and stripped of
identifiers, is entered into free databases.190 Database sharing exists for
practical reasons.191 Through the open sharing of data, hospitals can more
accurately and efficiently diagnose and treat illnesses; thus, medical
advancements come with a trade-off. 192 Medical information may be less
protected, yet medical treatment may improve.193 Researchers have, in fact,
re-identified genetic information retrieved from a grassroots database.194
The individual participated in a clinical trial, in which their data was
entered into an open database.195 Although that database did not include
“identifiable information,” researchers used a combination of open-source
ancestry databases and public genealogy databases to re-identify the
genetic sample.196
Patients that receive genetic analysis in hospitals will also have added
protections of CLIA and HHS Common Rule if they participate in research,
but as explained above these regulations do not provide privacy
protection.197 While in-hospital tests provide the additional benefit of
heightened accuracy and a professional’s opinion, privacy is not
necessarily any greater. In this context, HIPAA is a false promise.
185
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2. DTC Genetic Testing: The Greater the Market Pressure, the
Greater the Privacy
DTC companies like 23andMe and Helix are required to comply with
Common Rule and CLIA regulations when conducting federally-funded
research.198 These requirements are also applicable to in-hospital testing
and require the retention of testing information.199 CLIA regulations
require that laboratories conducting health information testing retain a
certain level of data for each individual and test.200 This includes the
retention of patient information and the types of testing ordered for at least
two years.201 CLIA, however, imposes higher retention standards for test
reports.202 For example, pathology tests are required to be retained for ten
years.203 This means that genetic testing data must be retained by
companies performing the testing to comply with CLIA. Consumers of
both in-hospital testing and DTC testing do not have a right to delete their
data.204
Consumers may be under the impression that they can delete their
data.205 However, consumers of products like 23andMe can only delete
their individual-level information to an extent.206 An individual can delete
their account on the website and request their physical samples (deposited
saliva) to be discarded, but cannot delete their genetic information or
personal identifiers during a period required by CLIA and the contract for
services.207 While consumers may benefit from CLIA, because the
regulations work to ensure accuracy in testing, the alternative consideration
is that an individual loses the right to delete their data when sending their
sample to a CLIA certified laboratory.208
Most privacy protections for DTC test consumers stem from the FTC
assuring that companies are held to their promises.209 The FTC can ensure
that any representations in the companies’s privacy policy are enforced.210
Therefore, the privacy protections found in DTC testing stem only from the
198
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privacy policy represented in the contract for services. These privacy
policies are non-negotiable and often overly complicated. Consumers have
only one option to protect their privacy: an adhesion contract. This is an
unfortunately unsatisfying answer when considering data as unique as
DNA.
There are various models amongst DTC testing companies that
depend partially upon the companies’ resources. For example, 23andMe is
considered one of the largest databases.211 Other companies, with smaller
pools of genetic information, may need to participate in data-sharing to a
larger extent than 23andMe. The privacy policy, however, on 23andMe’s
website reserves the company’s right to share consumers’ genetic
information and even individual level information with third party service
providers in limited circumstances.212 Data sharing exists in both inhospital genetic testing and DTC tests like 23andMe, but the exposure of
personal, identifiable health information may be greater in DTC tests,
dependent on the size of the company.213
The fact that 23andMe owns a large private database creates a
significant protection for consumer privacy. For example, as a result of
their success, 23andMe has few incentives to allow other individuals or
companies to access their databases. These market pressures caused DTC
companies to increase privacy; however, these market pressures and FTC
regulations remain the main incentives to protect the genetic information of
their customers. While individuals are afforded privacy protection when
they contract for the services of DTC tests, individuals deserve greater
protection than the choice between adhesion contracts of different DTC
companies. Because consumers are providing such important information,
consumers should have an opportunity to materially bargain or should be
afforded greater protection.
3. DTC Genealogy Testing Provides Little to No Privacy
Protection
Services like Ancestry provide genetic analyses that do not provide
health information.214 These services instead analyze DNA and input the
DNA into a database to find relatives or assess regional ethnicity.215
211
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BMC MEDICAL ETHICS, 2006, at 4; see also Ducharme, supra note 35 (explaining that
23andMe has over five million users).
212
Law
Enforcement
Report,
ANCESTRY.COM,
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
213
Id.
214
Geographical DNA Tests, ANCESTRY.COM, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/ (last
visited Nov. 15, 2019).
215
Id.

SKLAR (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

1/27/2020 12:06 PM

BE CAREFUL WHERE YOU SPIT

203

Because Ancestry does not provide health information or receive federal
funding, it is not necessary for Ancestry to comply with CLIA, Common
Rule, or FDA regulations. These three requirements apply to data utilized
for health information. Since these tests are not required to comply with
these regulations, there is no data retention requirement for genealogy
testing companies.216 Thus, if a consumer chooses genealogy testing over
health information, the consumer retains an option to delete their data.
Ancestry’s privacy policy states that they will delete “all genetic
information” within 30 days of a deletion request.217 This additional ability
to delete information mimics a progressive understanding of data
ownership.
A comparison of DTC genealogy testing and DTC genetic testing is
not a comparison of like outputs. One test provides health information and
the other settles curiosities of family origin. Both tests begin with the same
process: the analysis of DNA; however, one test is held to higher standards
than the other. These tests are under-regulated for DNA privacy. In theory,
an individual could sequence their DNA through an ancestry website and
later use that same sequence to receive health information. Genealogy
testing could allow a consumer to bypass any regulatory pathways already
in place.
Ancestry must comply with valid requests from law enforcement to
release personal information about their clients.218 Ancestry provides the
most clarity and transparency regarding which information and the
frequency in which the company must share information with law
enforcement. In addition, Ancestry publishes yearly reports that allow
consumers to understand the frequency with which Ancestry releases
information.219 Not all requests necessarily involve the disclosure of
genetic material or codes, but such an avenue exists if a valid request is
submitted.220
Genealogy testing companies also must comply with FTC guidelines
as DTC genetic testing companies do.221 It is important to note that while
the FTC does not provide failsafe protections for the consumer of genetic
testing, it is the single federal regulatory agency with privacy jurisdiction
over both DTC health and genealogy testing. The FTC regulation is
216
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imperfect because it does not provide privacy protection per se; instead, it
only enforces what has been promised by the company. The FTC will
likely have the power to administer any federal privacy law that may come
to fruition in the future.222 Arguably, because DTC genealogy and health
testing utilize the same sensitive re-identifiable information, the two
services should be regulated under like pathways. A privacy law would not
be effective if a such a bypass remains.
4. Publicly Accessible Genetic Databases Bypass Current
Privacy Protections
It is worth considering a final type of consumer tool used in the
analysis of DNA. Websites like GEDmatch.com allow consumers to
upload already digitized DNA data.223 GEDmatch.com recently came into
the spotlight as the genetic database that led to the capture of the Golden
State Killer.224 The website allows individuals to upload their genetic data
digitized from companies like Ancestry.com and share it through a free
database to find relatives that may use another website.225 GEDmatch.com
offers the least privacy protections of any above groups, because testing
was not performed on human samples but already digitized information.
Websites like GEDmatch.com allow individuals to quickly access vast
amounts of data.226 Their privacy policy boasts that the company takes care
in striking the right balance between individual privacy and access to
information.227 While this application is especially helpful to individuals
looking for long-lost relatives, DNA test consumers may be uploading
highly sensitive information without fully understanding the significant
risks. GEDmatch.com’s greatest shortcoming is the accessibility of the
database. Because the data is so freely available to anyone who wishes to
find a relative, the privacy of an individual is minimal. However, an
individual gives informed consent to this minimal privacy.228
5. Where Should you Spit?
There is no simple answer when considering where a consumer’s data
is most protected from the threat of privacy invasion. Practically, a
consumer would choose to narrow the type of testing based on the accuracy
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they require in output. Various studies questioned the accuracy of DTC
testing, which in part prompted increased regulation from the FDA.229 If an
individual is interested in learning about their risk of disease, they should
undoubtedly approach a healthcare professional. If a consumer is
concerned only with a curiosity to unlock their genetic building blocks, the
consumer must consider their privacy.
In a hospital setting, genetic data can be inputted into a publicly
accessible database like the 1000 Genomes Project or “Free the Data!” In
hospital and DTC health tests alike, consumers and patients do not have a
right to delete their data. Ancestry tests, however, leave consumers only
with the protections of the FTC and the contract entered into with the
testing company. An open database leaves consumer with the least
protection. Consumers must better inform themselves of the risk of
inputting their genetic information into a database, such as
GEDmatch.com. From this analysis, it is evident that privacy is lacking;
whether legal protections take the form of federal or state laws, more is
required to protect consumers.
VI. CONCLUSION
When lawmakers consider genetic privacy laws, they must consider
them as such: issues of genetic privacy. The rapid growth and expansion of
genetic analysis and the popularity of genetic testing amongst consumers
have left consumers unprotected. Because this field continues to grow and
develop, the laws must be adaptable, forward-looking, and specific to
genetics. Consumers of either DTC or in-hospital testing either for genetic
health analysis or genealogy must face serious compromise to receive the
information held in their DNA. However, if one wants to test their DNA,
where they should spit? The unfortunate and easiest answer is that you
should not. Current privacy protection is a misnomer; it does not protect
consumers. Future privacy regulation should specifically tackle the issues
of genetic privacy. Finally, these issues should balance the free flow of
data that allows for the development of genetic science with the rights of
consumers to have their privacy protected.
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